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Abstract
The natural resource curse paradox has given rise to a wide range of
explanations, which look at the economic, social and political characteristics of
resource-rich countries. This paper focuses on the political economy of natural
resources and finds that controlling for sociopolitical factors eliminates the
natural resource curse. The analysis then turns to these sociopolitical factors and
examines the significant, complex and varied effects of democratization on
economic growth in general, as well as in resource-rich countries in particular. I
conclude that the type of institutions needed for economic development in
resource-rich countries are not specific to either democratic or autocratic
systems, but are equally likely to be adopted by either regime, so that no one
ideology is more suitable than the other. A corollary to this, however, is the case
of weak democracies or low democratization levels. Such states are unable to
adopt the necessary strategies and institutions and, thus, pose the greatest threat
to economic growth in resource-rich countries. On the other hand, highly
autocratic systems in resource-rich countries, such as those in Bahrain and
UAE, or perfectly democratic systems, such as those in Norway and Iceland,
utilize resources more efficiently for economic development.
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1. Introduction
In the 1970’s, Venezuelan Oil Minister, Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo,
predicted that oil would one day ruin Venezuela, referring to the much-coveted
resource as “the devil’s excrement”. The ominous words have proved
disturbingly accurate in the last few decades and the empirical evidence behind
this has led economists to a baffling question: why is it that resource-rich
countries have been surpassed in economic performance by resource-poor
countries?
Alfonso’s chilling prophecy was not limited to his own country, or even
just to oil. Across geographical boundaries, economies with large deposits of
natural resources, including fossil fuels, minerals and rocks, have demonstrated
stunted development, compared with resource-poor economies. This paradox
became increasingly evident in the latter half of the twentieth century, with the
resource-poor countries, the so-called Asian Tigers, greatly outperforming most
resource-rich developing countries, such as, Venezuela, Iraq, Brazil and India.
This poses a critical question for development economists and policy makers,
answers to which have ranged from purely economic to institutional reasons.
There cannot be something inherently bad about the raw materials
themselves, the answer must lie in their extraction or exploitation. This paper
focuses on the political economy of the resource curse, and aims at explaining
the sociopolitical reasons behind it. Section 2 summarizes the literature that has
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provided the background and inspiration for my study, covering a wide range of
explanations and theoretical approaches to the subject. In section 3, I discuss the
panel dataset and conduct an empirical analysis of the effects of natural resource
dependence, the polity and stability on economic development. Isolating the
effects of natural resource dependence from key sociopolitical factors eliminates
the natural resource curse. Further, democratization is, in general, beneficial for
economic growth but natural resource dependence tends to dilute this effect. For
high-income

economies

and

highly-resource

dependent

economies

democratization can even GDP per capita. In section 4 there is a detailed
discussion of the key findings and section 5 concludes.
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2. Survey of Literature
In the latter half of the twentieth century, development problems became
ever more urgent and the focus of a large body of economic literature. As the
newly independent former colonies began struggling with economic hardship
and stunted growth, the field of development economics became largely
concerned with the reasons for this underperformance and solutions to the
perceived problems. One issue that came to light in this discourse was that
resource-poor, developing economies were outperforming the resource-rich
ones.
Richard M. Auty first coined the term “Resource Curse” in 1993 to
describe this paradoxical trend. As the following studies illustrate, much of the
literature in this field focused on purely economic explanations, such as
declining prices of raw materials, susceptibility of the resource-rich economy to
the Dutch Disease, as well as the idea that over-dependence on the primary
sector results in underdevelopment of the overall economy.
Focusing his research on Latin American countries, Auty (1993)
hypothesized that large natural resource endowments may not be beneficial for
the development of low and middle-income countries. He concluded that these
economies were indeed distorted by over-dependence on the natural resourcebased industry as natural resource industries have few linkages and do not build
human capital and, even more importantly, they cause the Dutch Disease, where
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natural resource rents cause the exchange rate to appreciate and, thus, render
other sectors of the economy uncompetitive.
The research into the natural resource curse, however, dates further back
than the coinage of the term. The work of Prebisch (1950) aimed at explaining
the economic hardship of Latin America. He pointed out that the prices of raw
materials, which were the main exports, were declining relative to manufactured
goods. Singer (1950) reached a similar conclusion but pointed to differing
income elasticities of demand for agricultural goods compared to manufactured
goods. What came to be known as the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis brought forth
the idea that countries with abundant natural resource wealth should not depend
on it for growth.
Sachs and Warner (1995) built on this work by conducting a worldwide
study of the resource curse hypothesis. Their findings were largely in line with
those discussed above, as they showed evidence of the Dutch Disease
hypothesis, where labor shifts from “learning-by-doing” sectors to the primary
sector. In a subsequent study Sachs and Warner (2001) explained the
phenomenon by arguing that resource-rich countries rely heavily on the
resource-based industry and, thus, fail to benefit from export-led growth.
This was merely an aspect of the great body of literature concerned with
the development problems of natural resource-dependent economies. While the
Dutch Disease hypothesis and the idea of over-dependence are enlightening
explanations, a deeper look at the factors at play is critical in understanding the
link between natural resource dependence and economic development.
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Favorable and growth-oriented policies are the driving forces behind economic
development. Without these even the wealthiest country may face stagnation,
inequality and poverty. Mehlum, et al. (2006) build upon the work by Sachs and
Warner, but reach a different conclusion, where the quality of institutions
determines whether or not a country suffers from the natural resource curse.
Thus, those resource-abundant countries that have better quality institutions
(according to the measure developed by the authors) do not suffer from a
resource curse at all. Such institutions are crucial in controlling the unfavorable
political incentives created by natural resource rents, especially corruption, as
factions compete to control the resources and use them for their political gain.
Politicians are seen as particularly susceptible to the temptations of natural
resource booms, as they struggle to remain in power and use the resource rents
to do so (Robinson et al., 2006). Another source of concern is that politicians in
resource-rich countries need not rely on the private sector for tax revenue, and
so they tend to leave it neglected and underdeveloped (Acemoglu, et al., 2000).
This shift in the emphasis on sociopolitical causes represents a larger shift in the
literature, where more recent studies focus largely on the polity and institutions.
Thus, the economic policies and policy makers in resource-rich countries are of
extreme relevance in this study of economic development.
Auty (2001) describes “a developmental political state” as a necessary
precondition for equitable economic development but one that is more likely to
be found in resource-poor countries. Sound economic policies and long-term
welfare exemplify this state. Auty (2001) then outlines the “staple trap model”,
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where resource-rich economies develop an over-dependence on the primary
sector, thus resulting in a lack of economic diversification, industrialization,
urbanization and human capital. This work suggests that the absence of a polity
that makes investments in long-term development leads to the resource curse.
Given the importance of economic policies in determining the economic
fate of a nation, I intend on exploring further the relationship between the polity
and economic performance. The work of Douglass North provides a foundation
for this, highlighting the correlation between sound institutions, efficient
enforcement mechanisms and economic performance. The central dilemma for
developing countries is, therefore, the development of a polity that efficiently
and impartially enforces contracts, property rights and the formal and informal
rules that structure economic exchange. Another issue of concern is that
efficient property rights may not exist because of bribery or because powerful
groups might be blocking them as they may be benefitting from the lack thereof.
The fact that incentives for corruption are greater in countries where the
potential benefits, that is, natural resource rents, are larger, explains why the
issues outlined by North, inefficient institutions, bribery and lack of property
rights and enforcement, may occur in resource-rich economies.
The result of inefficient and corrupt institutions and polity is that the
cost of transacting in third world economies tends to be very high. Moreover
lack of property rights and poor enforcement mechanisms mean that firms tend
to be small and large firms can exist only under government protection, so that
development in other sectors of the economy is obstructed. While North’s work
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was not specific to resource-rich countries, it outlines a problem where the
institutional

structure

does

not

encourage

productive

economic

and

developmental activity, and stands as an obstacle to socioeconomic
development.
The intersection of politics and economics is brought to light in North’s
work, and is a motivation for this study. Given the large body of literature that
has hypothesized correlations between natural resource abundance and
sociopolitical issues of political instability, authoritarianism and conflict, it is
conventional belief now that natural resource rents encourage bad institutions,
political uncertainty and violence conflict. With this as my theoretical
background, I intend on testing the hypothesis that the channel through which
resource dependence affects economic growth is the polity. As rent-seeking
elites have a source of easy revenue without having to invest in good institutions
and enforcement, there is little incentive for long-term development. My
analysis will lead me to a discussion of what characterizes a favorable polity in
the context of natural resource abundance. As the data will show, there is no
clear answer to this question but, for now, let us return to the foundations of this
study.
It seems intuitive that the potential control of a large natural resource
endowment would offer great incentives for violence between sociopolitical
factions. Collier and Hoeffler (2005) argue that the existence of natural resource
rents increases the risk of conflict, as they can finance rebellions. Further they
are likely to be looted by corrupt governments owing to ethnic fractionalization
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or inefficient institutions. Wantchekon (2000) addresses a number of potential
political effects of natural resource abundance. He argues that resource-rich
countries are likely to have authoritarian governments as the rents create
incentives for governments in power to become repressive and strengthen their
hold. This also creates potential for open conflict or civil war. Of interest here is
the idea that the correlation between natural resource wealth and economic
development occurs through a medium – whether it’s the rent-seeking activities
of factions or the socio-political structure and institutions of the society.
Economists have also brought to light evidence that social
fractionalization can have a negative effect on development. Easterly and
Levine (1997) constructed a measure of ethnic diversity to find its correlation
with economic growth. They find a negative relationship between ethnic
fractionalization and income per capita. While resource-rich economies have
failed to develop at steady rates, many of them have also been undergoing war,
ethnic tensions and violence. Further the creation of rents in resource-rich
economies tends to aggravate conflict and tensions, making the level of social
fractionalization deeply relevant to any study of the performance of resourcerich countries.
In addition to sociopolitical peace and stability, the type of political
regime also has a role to play and is a central point of focus of this paper. From
Venezuela to the Middle East, resource-rich countries tend to have authoritarian
regimes and do not benefit from democratic institutions. Ross (2001) explores
what he refers to as the “oil impedes democracy claim”. He found that oil

11

wealth does harm democracy and even more so in developing countries.
Although he focused largely on oil-dependent countries, he concluded that both
oil and mineral dependence lead to a “rentier effect”, where governments elude
democratic pressures through low taxes and high spending. Given the strong
empirical evidence of the negative correlation between resource wealth and
democracy, this area is worth probing further.
The central aim of this paper is to study the relationship between
resource-dependence and economic growth, as well as the relationship between
political stability and GDP growth in resource-dependent economies. As the
data shows in section 3, resource-rich countries tend to be less democratic than
the resource-poor. A study of the possible effects of democratic institutions on
these economies is of great importance. While the economic effects of
democracy have been heavily debated, the noneconomic merits of such a system
that promotes accountability and liberty need no explanation. Collier and
Hoeffler (2006) find an ambiguous, and often negative, correlation between
economic growth and democracy in the context of natural resource abundance,
but this should not lead one to conclude that the agenda of promoting
democracy in autocratic societies is counterproductive. The authors trace the
negative relationship to the idea that the pre-existing institutions in developing
countries are corrupt, so that bribery and vote buying are rampant and cannot be
prosecuted as the judiciary and the police are rarely independent. The existence
of large resource rents worsens the outcome, as sources of financing for corrupt
activities are abundant. The problem here lies in the fact that developing
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countries do not have as mature and thorough a system of checks and balances
as developed countries. Where there are large natural resource endowments,
therefore, this can create even more negative incentives, as the opportunities for
embezzlement and corruption are huge.
It is important to note, though, that a system of checks and balances
takes time to develop. As numerous economists have pointed out, institutions
are sticky and historically persistent. North (1990) made a significant
contribution to the literature on institutional change in his discussion of the
forces that shape it. He argues that the initial set-up costs of institutions are very
large and that there are increasing returns to institutions. Thus, once an
institutional framework is established, it is very costly to change it and the
benefits may not be realized in the short run. As a result, given a world
characterized by imperfect information, persistent underdevelopment will result
as existing institutions are continually reinforced. Thus, once a country is on a
particular development path, economic or political, it is difficult to set it on a
new course. Countries that face persistent underdevelopment are trapped in a
bad equilibrium where institutions and policies are unfavorable for economic
development. Corruption, inefficient property rights and lack of investment in
long-term development projects, such as infrastructure, education and finance,
may be some of the characteristics the institutional structures in these countries.
As an overhaul of the economic and political institutions is costly, the bad
equilibrium persists and development does not occur. Thus, once exploitive and
corrupt institutions are established, they are likely to endure and harm economic
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growth. In the case of the developing world, much of which is former colonies,
the establishment of these institutions can be traced to colonial times.
Acemoglu, et al. (2000) find that in resource-rich countries in particular,
colonizers tended to establish inferior institutions which best served the purpose
of extracting resources for profit rather than promoting economic growth. This
finding is critical in explaining what appears to be a curse of natural resources,
but may be better described as a curse of bad institutions.
As valuable natural resource endowments offer great short-term profits
they may encourage and reinforce such institutions, just as they did in the case
of colonial settlements discussed above. If the reason that natural resource rich
countries may be unable to develop is that they cannot establish favorable
institutions and are trapped in bad equilibria, the question arises of the kind of
institutions they need for economic growth.
Botswana is an example worthy of discussion here. While the country is
the largest diamonds-producer in the world, it has enjoyed political stability and
economic growth since independence over four decades ago. A significant
difference between Botswana and its resource-rich counterparts is its longrunning democracy. Relatively accountable and stable governance has led to
high investments in education, health, most notably, measures against
HIV/AIDS, and moves towards diversification of the economy. To extend the
discussion to energy sources, let us consider Norway, one of the largest oil
exporters in the world. Its unparalleled success in converting its oil endowment
into economic growth rather than a curse has resulted in the country being
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named the most developed country in the world in the UNHDI list. While oil
has been considered the most volatile and counterproductive of natural
resources, this example shows that the wealth it produces has the potential to
fuel long-term growth and development. It is not the substance in itself that is to
blame. Further pointing to the Dutch Disease does not go to the heart of the
problem. In fact, as the sixth largest oil exporter in the world, Norway is highly
dependent on its energy, which accounted for 50% of exports, 22% of GDP and
27% of resource revenues in 2009. What has made Norway distinct from its
resource-rich counterparts is its long-term strategy, characterized by high public
spending and welfare policies. These examples suggest then, that good
governance and development policies may result in an outcome very different to
the natural resource curse. This idea lies at the heart of this paper and motivates
the empirical analysis.
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3. Data Description and Analysis
3.1. Key Variables and Sources
The dataset includes 147 countries and ranges from the years 1960 to 1999.
Only those countries for which data was unavailable have been excluded from
the sample. The data is recorded in 5-year averages, i.e., 1960-1964, 1964-1969,
… , 1995-1999. The variables included are detailed below.

Log of GDP:
This is the dependent variable, which is intended to indicate the level of
economic growth for each country. It is calculated using real GDP per capita
(PPP adjusted), and is measured at the beginning of each 5-year period. This
variable was extracted from Collier & Hoeffler’s (2007) dataset.

Share of Exports that are Primary Products (SXP):
A measure of primary commodity exports as a fraction of GDP, this
independent variable is a proxy to natural resource abundance and it ranges
from 0 to 1. Using level of primary exports has been the norm in literature
exploring the natural resource curse. Primary products are all raw materials
extracted from the land and ocean and include industries such as agriculture,
forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying. This variable was extracted from Collier
& Hoeffler’s (2007) dataset. Henceforth, the abbreviation SXP will be used
interchangeably with level of natural resource abundance.
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At Civil War (atcivwar):
This is a civil war dummy that takes on a value of 1 if the country is
experiencing civil war. If a minimum of 1000 battle-related deaths occurs in any
given year, the civil war dummy takes on a value of 1. This variable was
extracted from Collier & Hoeffler’s (2007) dataset.

Social Fractionalization (frac):
This indicates the level of ethnic and religious fractionalization in each country.
The range is from 0, where the population is completely homogenous, to 10000
where the population is completely heterogeneous. Ethnic fractionalization is
defined as the probability that any two randomly drawn members of the
population will belong to two different ethnic groups. The religious
fractionalization index was drawn using data on religious affiliations. Together,
the product of the two indices plus the one that has the greater value equals the
social fractionalization index. This variable was extracted from Collier &
Hoeffler’s (2007) dataset.

Polity:
The values range from -10, for a highly autocratic system of governance, to
+10, for a strong democratic system. The variable is a combination of two
separate measures of “democracy” and “autocracy”. Given the subjectivity of
the two terms it is worthwhile to describe their usage here further. The former is
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assessed on three levels, firstly, the existence of institutions and procedures that
allow citizens to express their preferences and choose their leaders, secondly,
constraints on executive power and, finally, the extent of civil liberty. Thus,
countries that excel in the three aspects described above are seen as strong
democracies. The second measure, autocracy, explores the level of competitive
participation in politics, the procedures of selection of the chief executive and
the institutional restraints on executive power. Thus, countries that lack
competitive political participation, whose chief executives are selected by a
political elite and where the chief executive’s power is relatively unconstrained
are seen as autocracies. This variable was extracted from the Polity IV dataset.

Regime Change (regchange):
Where the polity score changes by over four points within any five-year
interval, it is though to be a period of regime change. This is consistent with the
Polity IV Project, which recognizes changes of over 4 points within three years
as regime changes. To apply this threshold to my dataset the time period is
altered to five years. Thus, regime change is a dummy variable, which takes on
the value 1 for a period of regime change and 0 otherwise. This variable is
intended to explain the effects of political change, instability and uncertainty on
economic development.

Democracy (Dem):
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Using the Polity III dataset, Collier & Hoeffler calculated this variable to
measure the openness of institutions. It ranges from 0 to 10, with higher
numbers indicating greater levels of democracy, or openness.

Oil:
This is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 for those countries where the
bulk of GDP reflects the value of extracted oil (Mankiw, et al., 1992). In this
case GDP will necessarily be closely and positively correlated with the level of
natural resource dependence and will, therefore, skew the data. Another source
of concern is that oil is a commodity that is associated with an unusual amount
of volatility and unrest. As Terry Karl (2007) notes, oil possesses certain
characteristics that set it apart from other resources. These include its
importance as an energy source that fueled global industrialization, the fact that
it is scarce and non-renewable and its price volatility and consequent boom-bust
cycles. The rents from oil are also large compared to other raw materials –
leading to its appropriate description as “black gold” – and mean that a large oil
endowment has great potential to skew the incentives of leaders and politicians
and encourage unrest and corruption.

Regional dummies:
There are regional dummies for Africa, Asia and Latin America. These
variables takes on a value of 1 if the country is in the region specified, and 0
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otherwise. It is included to control for any regional or geographical differences
that may account for inter-country differences in growth rates.

GDP/Capita:
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population,
expressed in current U.S. dollars, for the year 2008. The source is World
Development

Indicators.

Data

is

available

at

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.

Literacy Rate:
Adult literacy rate is the percentage of people ages 15 and above who can,
with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their
everyday life. The data used is for the year 2008. The source is World
Development

Indicators,

and

the

data

is

available

at

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS.

Life Expectancy:
Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant
would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to
stay the same throughout its life. The data used is for the year 2008. The
source is World Development Indicators and the data is available at
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN.
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Public Spending on Education:
This variable expresses the government spending on education as a percentage
of total GDP. The data used is for the year 2002 as there was considerable
missing data for more recent years. The source is World Bank Development
Indicators

and

the

data

can

be

found

at

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS/countries.

Public Health Expenditure:
This variable represents public health expenditure as a percentage of total
expenditure on health in the nation. The data used is for the year 2008. The
source is World Bank Development Indicators and the data can be found at
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.PUBL/countries.

3.2. Summary Statistics
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the full sample, as well as two
subgroups, one of high-income countries and the other of middle and lowincome countries. The division is in accordance with the World Bank’s
classification of countries by Gross National Income, where the high-income
countries (those with an income per capita greater than $12,196 in the year
2009) are placed in the “High-Income Countries” sample, and the rest are
lumped in the “Middle and Low-Income Countries” sample.
As the first row indicates, on average, the high-income economies tend
to have greater levels of natural resource dependence. Thus, countries with large
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natural resource endowments are not necessarily poor, as the resource curse
hypothesis would have one believe. This observation reinforces the idea that it
is not the natural resource endowment that often results in the paradox of plenty,
but other factors that may or may not be related to it.
As the table goes on to show, the lower-income economies tend to be
less democratic than the high-income countries. Moreover, they suffer greater
social fractionalization and a higher incidence of civil war as well as regime
change. Together this shows that lower income countries are not only more
authoritarian but also suffer greater unrest and political instability. This provides
the basis for the detailed study of the relationship between the polity and
economic development in the next two sections. While lower-income countries
are not distinct from higher-income countries in terms of natural resource
dependence, there are differences with regard to sociopolitical climate. The
implication is that the answer to the paradox of plenty lies in the political
economy of developing nations, and the next section will empirically test this
hypothesis.
Given the large body of literature concerned with the effect of natural
resource endowments on economic growth it is worth considering whether or
not there is empirical evidence of a natural resource curse. Mehlum, et al.
(2006) describe countries with a ratio of primary product exports to total exports
(SXP) of greater than 10%, as highly resource-dependent. Identifying those
countries with an SXP value greater than 0.1 for a majority of the forty-year
period, resulted in a sample of 64 low-dependence countries and 83 high-
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dependence countries. Finally, a fourth sample was made to represent only those
high-SXP countries, which have authoritarian institutions, or an average polity
value of zero or less. Table 2 shows some important statistics for these
countries.
I explored the areas of income per capita, education and health as these
are considered important indicators of living standard, well-being and
socioeconomic development. As the table shows, the low-SXP economies have
a far higher income per capita than the high-SXP economies, on average. The
high-SXP economies perform lower than the world average, even though
valuable natural resources such as oil and diamonds, can contribute heavily to
GDP. Moreover, once the democratic countries are taken out of the subset, GDP
per capita falls considerably lower. This indicates that countries with high
resource endowments may perform even worse if they are non-democratic.
For the literacy rate and life expectancy rows, the high-SXP nations
perform lower than the world average, while the authoritarian, high-SXP
nations continue to perform the worst. This indicates that countries with large
natural resource endowments may perform worse in areas of social
development. The fact that the non-democratic nations in this group perform
even worse, indicates that democratic institutions may be important for
socioeconomic development. It also reaffirms the idea that large natural
resource rents create political and economic incentives that are incompatible
with economic development, for example, to loot the easily available wealth
rather than invest it in long-term development projects. To explore this area
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further the table looks at public expenditure on the key variables of education
and health, as such investments are crucial to economic growth. Public
expenditure on education appears the lowest for the low-SXP nations. This
should be interpreted with caution, however, as the expenditure is expressed as
a percentage of GDP and may be low because the countries in this sample have
relatively high levels of GDP. It is important to note that the authoritarian, highSXP nations perform worse than their democratic counterparts in this area. In
terms of public expenditure on health, the low-SXP nations perform the best
while, the authoritarian, high-SXP continue to underperform.
Finally, the last row shows that the average polity level for high-SXP
nations is far lower than that for the world. The polity value in the last column
simply indicates that the authoritarian, high-SXP nations are defined by a polity
value lower than 0. The numbers imply that high-SXP nations are more likely to
be authoritarian than low-SXP nations. These results are in keeping with the
literature, and indicate the need to further explore the interaction of the polity
and natural resource endowments.
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Table 1. Mean value and standard deviation, for each independent variable for
different samples.
High
Middle
and
Variable
Full
Income
Low
Income
Sample
Countries
Countries
0.16
0.19
0.15
SXP
(0.19)
(0.28)
(0.13)
3.96
7.13
2.67
Democracy
(4.20)
(4.22)
(3.44)
Social
1880
837.65
2280.11
Fractionalizat
(1921.31)
(1154.18)
(2005.49)
ion
Regime
0.34
0.26
0.38
Change
(0.47)
(0.44)
(0.48)
0.12
0.003
0.17
At Civil War
(0.32)
(0.06)
(0.37)
0.13
0.24
0.09
Oil
(0.34)
(0.43)
(0.29)

Table 2. Average income per capita, literacy rate, life expectancy and polity values
for different samples.
World Average Low-SXP
High-SXP
High-SXP
&
Authoritarian
GDP/capita
$14749.
$17032.
$12744.
$8075.6
29
87
19
7
Literacy Rate
79.47%
81.71%
77.86%
75.68%
Life
68.34
70.71
66.20
63.65
Expectancy
years
years
years
years
Public
4.73%
4.52%
4.97%
4.55%
Education
Expenditure
Public Health
57.5%
58.38%
56.93%
53.09%
Expenditure
Polity
-0.2
0.63
-1.03
Polity<0
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3.3. Methodology
The purpose of my empirical analysis is to explore the effects of
political regime and climate on economic growth, in the context of natural
resource abundance. Using panel data on 147 countries, I explore whether or not
there is evidence of a negative correlation between natural resource dependence
and GDP growth. Adding variables that are indicative of the sociopolitical
climate in each country, I was further able to observe how sociopolitical factors
interact with natural resource dependence to affect growth outcomes. As this is
ultimately a study of economic development, observing dynamics and
developments over time is absolutely necessary. Development is not an
immediate occurrence and, as is extremely relevant to this study, it takes time to
develop institutions and policies that are compatible with economic growth.
Thus, the motivation behind panel data was to observe economic and political
dynamics over time. Moreover, data across several countries gives indications
of general trends and prerequisites for development, rather than country-specific
explanations.
The next step in formulating an econometric methodology was choosing
which variables to include in the model. The dependent variable is log of GDP
per capita, as GDP per capita stands as the most useful quantitative measure of
economic growth. Next the measure for natural resource dependence was
chosen, as well as controls for geographic region. An additional control, the oil
dummy, was used to control for the effect of oil, as it is considered to be the
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natural resource that is most incompatible with development and stability.
Finally, the most useful sociopolitical indicators had to be identified. To capture
the effect of the polity, I wished to account for the nature of the political regime
and institutions, as well as for their stability. Thus, the democracy variable
indicates the nature of the regime, while the regime change variable indicates
the uncertainty of the political climate and the fragility of the state. The other
area I wished to explore was social unrest as a society riddled with violence and
factionalism is unattractive for investment and unlikely to develop. The civil
war dummy represents social unrest and violence, and the social
fractionalization indicator is used as an alternate measure of the same.
Finally, a random effects model was chosen as the sociopolitical
variables and the regional dummies can account for some of the countryspecific differences. The base regression takes the following form,
Yit = α + βXit + ε,
where Y is log of GDP per capita, β is a vector of regression coefficients and Xit
includes all the independent explanatory and control variables.

3.4 Results
The hypothesis was that natural resource endowments, in the enormous
wealth they have the potential to produce, are beneficial to economic growth. In
the absence of a growth-compatible sociopolitical climate, however, that same
wealth has the potential to create corrupt and inefficient institutions,
sociopolitical conflict and instability and economic decline. Thus, the
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regressions include controls for sociopolitical factors, to isolate the effect of
natural resource dependence. It was further hypothesized that democratic
institutions, owing to their transparent and accountable nature, would be most
beneficial for economic growth. Meanwhile, given the great body of literature
discussing the incentives for conflict that are produced by natural resource rents,
it was hypothesized that sociopolitical uncertainty and conflict could explain
much of the growth problems of the resource-rich, developing world. These
factors were then explored further to reach a better understanding of the
development problems of resource-rich countries.
The base regression (Regression 1.1) is on the entire sample of 147
countries, while the regression in the second column of Table 1 is for a subset of
high-income economies and the third column is for the remaining low and
middle-income countries, as defined by the World Bank. Table 4 carries out the
same regressions, but each sample is reduced to exclude oil-producers to ensure
the effects are robust.
The main regression results indicate that the relationship between natural
resource dependence and economic growth is positive and significant for the
full sample, as well as the subset of high-income economies. While the positive
effect does extend to the low and middle-income sample, it is insignificant.
Regressions 1.1 and 1.2 also suggest that, there are decreasing returns to natural
resource dependence, so that higher levels of dependence are decreasingly
beneficial for economic growth. This may lead to the conclusion that as long as
dependence does not increase beyond a certain point, there will be a positive
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effect on economic growth. However, the finding is insignificant and does not
extend to Regression 1.3. The large and positive coefficients on SXP confirm
the hypothesis that natural resource abundance, in isolation from other factors,
can fuel great economic growth.
Table 4 replicates the regressions in Table 3, but on a smaller dataset
that now excludes the oil-dependent economies. While there are certain
differences, the positive effect of natural resource dependence is consistent and
robust. There are two notable differences that are worthy of discussion here.
First, the increase in the coefficients on SXP suggests that oil is less beneficial
for economic growth than other natural resources. Second, the weak evidence
for decreasing returns to natural resource dependence in regression 1.2 becomes
significant in regression 2.2
The regressions in Tables 1 and 2 show that after controlling for
sociopolitical factors, as well as, geographical location, natural resource
dependence has a positive effect on economic growth. This relationship is only
insignificant in the case of the middle and low-income group. This shows that
while the relationship may be positive, the two variables may also be
uncorrelated. The important conclusion to draw here is that no negative
relationship was found that might explain the development problems of the
middle and low-income countries. The regression analysis, therefore, goes on to
explore the effects of the polity on economic growth.
The coefficient on the democracy variable for the full sample in Table 1
is positive but insignificant. A look at Regression 1.2 for the high-income group
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shows a significant relationship where the positive effects of democracy set in
only after a certain point. A simple calculation shows that this point occurs
where the democracy value is 3.75. This indicates that once institutions have
developed to a point where they are sufficiently open and transparent,
democracy can have huge benefits for economic growth. This result extends to
Table 2 where the oil producing countries are excluded, so that the increasing
returns to democratic institutions are significant and robust for the high-income
group. Regression 1.3 and 2.3 show that the positive effects of democracy are
significant and robust for the middle and low-income group, with the higher
positive coefficient in Regression 2.3 implying that democratic institutions may
be less valuable for oil-dependent countries. These regressions further show that
there are decreasing returns to democratic institutions so that, at greater levels of
openness and transparency, the gains in economic growth become smaller and
smaller. While this coefficient is insignificant, the nonlinearities in the
relationship between economic growth and democracy will be explored further.
Given the significantly positive effect of democratic institutions on
economic growth, it is important to further explore the effect of institutions in
the presence of large natural resource endowments. The coefficient on the
interaction variable (SXP*dem) is intended to show whether the effect of
natural resource dependence on economic growth depends on the polity of the
country. The value is negative, significant and robust across all the samples in
Tables 3 and 4, implying that democratic institutions are not beneficial to
economic growth in a context of natural resource dependence. Thus, while
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democratic institutions are, in general, beneficial for economic growth, for
countries with large natural resource endowments, authoritarian governments
are more favorable. This outcome is discussed in greater detail in the next
section.
The next two variables in Tables 3 and 4 explore the effects of political
uncertainty and social unrest on economic growth. The regime change variable
has a negative and significant effect that is robust throughout the samples, with
the exception of the high-income groups. The insignificance here may, however,
be explained by the fact that regime change is rare in this group and, therefore,
does not correlate with fluctuations in GDP per capita. In fact, as the summary
statistics show, the average incidence of regime change is far lower for the highincome group than for the middle and low-income group. This indicates that
political stability may play a large part in economic growth outcomes.
The civil war variable is intended to denote the effect of social unrest on
economic growth, which is found to be insignificant across all the samples in
Tables 3 and 4. The variable is omitted in Regression 2.2 as none of the
countries in the sample had a civil war during the time interval studied. The
civil war variable has been substituted for the social fractionalization variable,
which also represents the level of social unrest, in the regressions in Table 5.
The results continue to be insignificant, except in the case of Regression 3.2,
where there is a significant, positive effect of social fractionalization on
economic growth. It should be noted, however, as the summary statistics show,
that, on average, the high-income nations are far less ethnically and religiously
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fractionalized than the middle and low-income nations. This may be indicative
of the fact that below certain levels and in certain conditions, ethnic
fractionalization is not harmful. One of these conditions may be the existence of
just and democratic institutions that promote stability, invest in public welfare
and, therefore, prevent social unrest. Thus, as the summary statistics show,
high-income countries have far more democratic institutions than the
developing countries as well as the whole world, on average.
Further, table 5 shows that the coefficients on the interaction variable
(SXP*frac) are negative, but insignificant, for all the samples. Thus, while
natural resource abundance may be negative for economic growth where there is
social fractionalization, it is also likely that the two may be uncorrelated. I
conclude, therefore, that social unrest does not play a significant role in
economic growth and the null hypothesis must be rejected.
The oil variable in Table 3 is designed to control for the abundance of
oil, as it is often believed to be the most contentious of the natural resources. As
discussed previously, oil has been hypothesized to hinder democratic
institutions and to create conflict. The results show, however, that the existence
of oil wealth has a positive effect on GDP per capita. This is significant only for
the full sample, and is intuitive as oil is one of the most valuable resources and
oil-dependent countries such as UAE and Saudi Arabia earn high incomes from
it.
Finally, the last three variables are regional dummies. The Africa
dummy is omitted for the high-income group as none of the countries in this
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sample are in Africa. The negative coefficients on Africa and Asia are negative,
significant and robust across Tables 3 and 4, while the coefficient on the Latin
American dummy is ambiguous in its effect on economic growth.

Table 3. Economic Growth, Natural Resource Dependence and the Polity
Regression 1.1
Regression 1.2
Regression 1.3
SXP

1.157***
1.630**
0.501
(0.369)
(0.722)
(0.488)
2
SXP
-0.177
-0.774
0.646
(0.402)
(0.635)
(0.795)
dem
0.029
-0.240***
0.060***
(0.019)
(0.074)
(0.019)
dem2
0.003
0.032***
-0.003
(0.002)
(0.007)
(0.002)
SXP*dem
-0.232***
-0.243***
-0.170***
(0.035)
(0.069)
(0.040)
regchange
-0.073**
-0.058
-0.078***
(0.032)
(0.102)
(0.030)
atcivwar
-0.005
0.233
0.010
(0.043)
(0.402)
(0.038)
Oil
0.467***
0.041
0.192
(0.156)
(0.170)
(0.209)
Africa
-1.805***
(omitted)
-1.174***
(0.134)
(0.249)
Latin
-0.815***
0.600
-0.241
America
(0.156)
(0.377)
(0.261)
Asia
-0.868***
-0.050
-0.672***
(0.149)
(0.165)
(0.265)
Observations
1176
328
848
Notes: Dependent variable: log of GDP per capita. Standard deviations are in
parentheses.
*=significant at the 10% level
**= significant at the 5% level
***= significant at the 1% level
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Table 4. Economic Growth, Natural Resource Dependence and the Polity in nonOil Exporting Countries
Regression 2.1
Regression 2.2
Regression 2.3
SXP

1.586***
4.338***
0.505
(0.513)
(1.023)
(0.593)
2
SXP
-0.918
-3.098**
0.536
(0.781)
(1.280)
(1.073)
dem
0.022
-0.137*
0.049**
(0.021)
(0.073)
(0.020)
dem2
0.004
0.024***
-0.001
(0.002)
(0.007)
(0.002)
SXP*dem
-0.224***
-0.393***
-0.148***
(0.042)
(0.081)
(0.049)
regchange
-0.064*
-0.065
-0.074**
(0.034)
(0.113)
(0.032)
atcivwar
-0.008
(omitted)
0.008
(0.044)
(0.039)
Africa
-1.719***
(omitted)
-1.177***
(0.138)
(0.241)
Latin
-0.724***
0.459*
-0.207
America
(0.157)
(0.279)
(0.254)
Asia
-0.949***
-0.151
-0.710***
(0.155)
(0.134)
(0.259)
Observations
1016
248
768
Notes: Dependent variable: log of GDP per capita. Standard deviations are in
parentheses.
*=significant at the 10% level
**= significant at the 5% level
***= significant at the 1% level
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Table 5. Economic Growth, Natural Resource Dependence and Social
Fractionalization
Regression 3.1
Regression 3.2
Regression 3.3
SXP

1.794***
1.899***
0.773
(0.465)
(0.733)
(0.531)
2
SXP
-0.519
-0.80*
0.835
(0.418)
(0.642)
(0.818)
dem
0.027
-0.191***
0.060***
(0.019)
(0.069)
(0.018)
2
dem
0.003
0.027***
-0.003
(0.002)
(0.007)
(0.002)
SXP*dem
-0.228***
-0.207***
-0.169***
(0.036)
(0.079)
(0.040)
regchange
-0.069**
-0.044
-0.079**
(0.032)
(0.093)
(0.030)
frac
-0.00002
0.0002***
0.00002
(0.00003)
(0.00005)
(0.00004)
SXP*frac
-0.0001
-0.0003
-0.0001
(0.00008)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
Africa
-1.745***
(omitted)
-1.123***
(0.149)
(0.259)
Latin
-0.872***
0.314
-0.274
America
(0.155)
(0.360)
(0.274)
Asia
-0.954***
-0.061
-0.668**
(0.152)
(0.151)
(0.276)
Observations
1176
328
848
Notes: Dependent variable: log of GDP per capita. Standard deviations are in
parentheses.
*=significant at the 10% level
**= significant at the 5% level
***= significant at the 1% level
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4. Discussion of the Key Findings
4.1. Is there a Natural Resource Curse?
One of the key findings of this paper is that, after controlling for
sociopolitical factors, natural resource dependence does not have a negative
effect on economic growth. On the contrary, the positive effect is robust and is
significant in all cases except for the middle and low-income sample. This is
consistent with conventional thinking that large natural resource endowments
are less beneficial for middle and low-income countries (Auty, 1993). It is
important to note, however, that the coefficient is not negative for any of the
samples. This reaffirms my hypothesis that natural resource abundance is, itself,
neutral to economic growth and the hypotheses of other researchers such as,
Mehlum et al., who divide countries into those with good institutions versus
those with bad institutions and show that the former do not suffer a resource
curse at all (Mehlum, et al., 2006). Thus, the affect of natural resource
abundance on economic growth is dependent upon the political economy.
Therefore, let us now turn the discussion to the political economy of the
resource curse.

4.2. The Effect of Democratization on Economic Growth
While the positive effects of democracy are robust across all samples, it is
insignificant for the full sample. Looking at the effects for the subsets of high-
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income countries and middle and low-income countries provides more insight
into this relationship. In general, the effects for both groups are positive, but the
relationship is complex and there are important differences. The non-linear
relationship is significant for the high-income sample but insignificant for the
developing countries group.
As the summary statistics show, developing countries are less likely to have
democratic regimes than high-income countries. In fact, the conditions that are
favorable for the existence and development of democratic institutions have
been the subject of a great body of literature. Lipset (1959) suggested that
wealthier countries were better able to sustain democracies owing to their
improved social conditions and more equitable socioeconomic structure, which
bring social stability. Muller’s (1995) study reinforces this conclusion, as he
finds that income inequality obstructs democratic institutions. As inequality is
generally higher in developing countries, this explains why they are less likely
to have democratic regimes. This aspect of the literature concerns itself with the
effect of income level on the polity. It is important to consider the opposite
direction of causality as well, since the quality and nature of institutions and
policies inevitably effect subsequent economic development.
A large body of literature is concerned with the affect of democratic
institutions on economic growth, and its dependence on the level of economic
development. The debate is ongoing and inconclusive as there are prominent
political and economic theorists on each side. The arguments of the proauthoritarianism theorists center around the idea that, given all the issues facing
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third world countries, only authoritarian regimes can spur economic growth. An
example of this is that social fractionalization may be less harmful for
development in autocratic countries, where any grievances can be silenced and
rebellions can be repressed. Those arguing for the positive effects of democracy
focus on the benefits of civil liberties, accountability and political and economic
freedoms on growth (Sirowy & Inkeles, 1990).
The ambiguity of the relationship between the polity and economic growth
in the literature is also reflected in the empirical analysis of the dataset. The
graph below illustrates the effect of democracy on log of GDP per capita for
each sample.
Figure 1. The Effect of Democratic Institutions on Economic Growth
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Note: The graph illustrates the relationship between the level of democratization and
log of GDP per capita. This is given by the regression results 1.2 and 1.3 in Table 3.
For the high income economies, Δln gdp = -0.240ΔXDem + 0.032ΔXDem2 and, for the
middle and low-income economies, Δln gdp = 0.060ΔXDem – 0.170ΔXDem2).

The figure above shows that increasing the level of democracy affects
growth rates of developed countries differently from those of developing
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countries. The first step towards understanding this difference is to identify the
differences between high-income countries and middle and low-income
countries in order to understand why democracy may affect the economy
differently in each sample. Developed and developing economies differ in
several aspects of political, economic and social life. The differences that are
most relevant to this study are in the areas of income distribution, institutional
efficiency and transparency, the nature and size of the public sector, the
provision of public goods and public investment in social welfare
As the Kuznets curve illustrates, income inequality is rises in the low to
middle-income range, after which it starts to fall. Thus, in general, the countries
in the sample of middle and low-income economies will have greater income
inequality. Moreover, Sacks (2010) finds that individual well-being is
significantly correlated with income level, so that the citizenry of high-income
countries are more likely to have “life satisfaction”. This would also presumably
make for a more peaceful society. Given that democratic governments are
characterized by greater spending on public welfare and more meritocratic
institutions, it is easy to see how the potential economic benefits of
democratization would be great for the third world, especially in the area of
income inequality.
With regard to public spending, Devarajan, et al. (1996) argue that the
developing world may be growing slower due to the misallocation of public
investment. They find that overinvestment in capital goods slows growth, and
suggest that the public sector in developing countries should shift expenditure

39

from capital investment to consumption goods. It is intuitive that democratic
states face greater pressure for expenditure on welfare and consumption,
particularly as they are accountable to the electorate and must satisfy voters in
order to remain in power. Government expenditures that yield immediate
benefits are, therefore, likely to be favored in democratic regimes. This finding
is of importance here as, not only does it refute one of the main arguments for
authoritarianism in the third world, but is also reaffirmed by the upward growth
trajectory of developing countries as democratization takes place This work
suggests, therefore, that the democratic regimes’ lower propensity to save may
be beneficial for the third world.
Moreover, given the freedoms and liberalization that accompany
democratization, the upward trajectory of developing countries in Figure 1 may
also be explained by the economic benefits of these. While the economic effect
of the extension of civil liberties is a source of contention, many economists
argue that such freedoms are a necessary condition for economic growth
(Nelson and Singh, 1998). Further, sociopolitical freedoms and the abilities to
receive an education, find adequate employment and to actively participate in
society are best granted by democratic regimes, which are necessarily more
receptive to the needs of the citizenry. It is clear how such a climate would
better promote education, employment, competition and efficiency.
Mourmouras and Rangazas (2008) point out that the public sector expands
as development occurs and the economy shifts from traditional to modern
production methods. The discrepancy they find is that today’s developing
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economies have a larger government size relative to their development level,
than today’s developed world and explain that this may be a result of less
democratic institutions. The economists find that larger public sectors obstruct
modernization through higher tax rates, which may result from a lack of concern
for economic development and modernization, or from the political leverage of
the landed elites. The problem for economic growth lies in a large,
undemocratic public sector that inefficiently allocates resources. Thus, middle
and low-income economies tend to have large public sectors, but are unlikely to
have democratic governments, resulting in a prolonged dependence on the
traditional sector. Again, it is easy to see how the economic benefits of
democratization – in this case, modernization of the economy – would be large
for developing countries, in particular.
For the middle and low-income countries sample, therefore, democratization
is especially conducive to economic growth, as it has the potential to reduce
inequality and increase general well being, liberalize the sociopolitical and
economic structures and efficiently allocate resources. In contrast to this,
democratization in the high-income economies has a more ambiguous effect on
economic growth. In fact, as these countries first begin to democratize, the
effect on economic growth is negative. When they reach a level of 3.75 (on the
democracy scale of 0-10) the relationship inverts and positive and increasing
returns set in.
As discussed above, the literature suggests several channels through which
the process of democratization may have negative effects on economic growth.
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The first question to consider is the allocation of resources, as this is the most
important channel through which the polity can affect economic growth. In an
advanced democracy, which has transparent voting and justice systems, the
government will presumably utilize resources efficiently and with the aim of
producing the best public good and economic development. In a weak
democracy, however, there is less accountability and corrupt politicians may
loot public resources (Collier & Hoeffler, 2007). The wealth of high-income
economies makes them more susceptible to this outcome, as the potential profits
of corruption are very large. Moreover, as people gain more freedom and
education, they also develop the means to voice their opinions, demand their
rights and play a part in the policy-making process. Thus, at earlier stages, while
institutions are still weak and governments do not have the legitimacy those of
more advanced democracies do, social conflict and unrest may rise and this can
negatively affect growth rates. These factors can explain much of the variation
in the effects of democracy between the developing and the developed countries
samples. Corruption, unjust and inefficient institutions and social unrest are
issues that are characteristic of developing nations regardless of political
regime.
The idea that there will be less accountability at lower levels of democracy
than in an authoritarian regime is contingent upon the assumption that the
authoritarian regime in question is relatively benevolent and just, and has an
efficient law and order system. In the case of most developing nations this is not
the case, as most states are autocratic, and are also rife with corruption. Thus, it
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is plausible that even a weak democratic regime may have marginally better
checks and balances. In the case of the high-income nations, on the other hand,
those that are highly autocratic are countries such as, Bahrain, UAE and Saudi
Arabia, which have well-developed autocratic institutions and, though there is
little freedom, these countries enjoy relative sociopolitical stability. It is not
surprising then, that weak democratic institutions may be relatively less
favorable for economic growth than the well-established autocratic regimes.
Thus, while the effects of democratic institutions may be negative at first, at
higher levels of democracy, the positive gains set in.
It is also important to consider possible biases in the data. First, of the 41
high-income countries, over 25% are identified oil-exporters, while only under
10% of the middle and low-income countries are identified as such. Many oilrich countries tend to have authoritarian governments as well as high incomes,
and it is now believed that petro-states are unique in their development issues,
trajectories and solutions. It is interesting to note that removing the oilexporting countries from the high-income sample alters the relationship, as
shown in Figure 2. This illustrates that the relationship between the polity and
economic growth may be different in the context of resource abundance, a
finding that is explored in the next section.

43

Figure 2. The Effect of Democratic Institutions on Economic Growth in highincome, non oil-exporting countries.
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Note: This graph shows the effect of an increase in the level of democratization on log
of GDP per capita, for a subset of high-income economies that excludes the oilproducing countries. This is in accordance with regression 2.2 in Table 4, so that Δln
gdp = --0.137XDem + 0.024 XDem2.

4.3. The Role of the Polity in the Natural Resource Curse
While the statistical findings indicated that natural resource abundance,
in isolation from other factors, is beneficial for economic growth, interacting the
former with democracy resulted in a negative and significant effect on economic
growth. The natural resource curse exists, therefore, but only for countries
which have democratic regimes. Economists agree that, in the absence of
institutions that effectively check corruption, natural resource endowments
result in a resource curse. Robinson et al. (2006) find that natural resource
booms create perverse political incentives that, in the absence of good
institutions, cause the natural resource curse. Thus, without an independent
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judiciary, for example, politicians are more likely to misuse natural resource
rents to remain in power.
Collier and Hoeffler (2007) emphasize the need for checks and balances
in controlling the negative incentives created by natural resource rents. This is
especially relevant as they conclude that the lack of checks and balances in
developing countries makes democracy unfavorable for growth. High resource
rents exacerbate the issue of corruption in such countries as they increase
embezzlement, so that politicians use resource revenues for their own political
gain rather than for the provision of public goods. This paper confirms this
conclusion, but also extends it to the developed world. Tables 3, 4 and 5 show
that the negative effect of natural resource abundance, where there is a
democratic regime, is even greater for the high-income sample.
Thus, on average, even in high-income, resource-rich economies,
democratic regimes may give rise to the natural resource curse. Figure 3 shows
the effect on GDP per capita of an increase in the level of democratization at
various levels of natural resource dependence. For the middle and low-income
sample, increasing the level of democratization positively affects growth at low
levels of resource dependence. As natural resource dependence increases, the
positive affect is increasingly diluted. Beyond a resource dependence level of
35%, increasing democratization reduces income per capita. This confirms
Collier & Hoeffler’s (2007) finding that promoting democracy in the resourcerich, developing world will not have positive effects on economic development.
The sample of high-income economies extends this finding to the developed
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world as well. As the regression results showed, democratization reduces
income per capita in high-income economies. As Figure 3 shows, at higher
levels of resource dependence, the negative affect increases in magnitude at a
rate faster than that for developing countries. This indicates that democratization
is even more harmful for high-income economies at higher levels of resourcedependence than for low-income economies.
Figure 3. The effect on log of GDP of increasing the level of democracy by 1 unit
depends on whether or not there is natural resource abundance
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Note: The graph shows the effect on log of GDP of increasing SXP by 10% at various
levels of democracy. This is given by regressions 1.2 and 1.3 in Table 3. For the highincome sample this is given by the equation, Δln gdp = ΔXDem * (-0.240 + 0.032ΔXDem
– 0.243Xsxp), and for the middle and low-income sample, the equation is Δln gdp =
ΔXDem * (0.060 – 0.170XSXP).

The literature suggests that democratization only has this effect in the
case of resource-rich, developing countries where institutions are less
transparent and efficient and there is little accountability. The data, however,
suggests that democratic institutions are even less beneficial for high-income,
resource-rich countries. A look at this subset of resource-rich (those with an
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average SXP value greater than 0.1) high-income economies provides some
insight. Figure 4 shows that the more resource-dependent economies tend to
have autocratic regimes. These include countries such as Bahrain, Oman,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE, which have high levels of resource-dependence
and autocratic institutions, but also enjoy high levels of income per capita.
Moreover, as the regression results in Table 4 show, excluding the oil-producing
nations from the sample does not alter this negative effect.

Democracy Level

Figure 4. Democracy and SXP Levels for a sample of High-Income, Resource-Rich
Countries.
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Note: This graph shows observations of democracy level and SXP for a sample of highincome and resource-rich economies. This is a subset of the high-income sample,
which excludes all the high-income countries, which have an average SXP value below
0.1 for the 1960-99 period.

Taking a different approach to interpreting the interaction variable,
figure 4 shows the effect of increasing SXP by 10% on log of GDP per capita,
when the effect of an increase in SXP depends on the level of democratization.
This illustrates the statistical result that natural resource abundance holds
greater benefits for economic development in less democratic societies. In fact,
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in highly democratic societies, an increase in the level of natural resource
dependence reduces income per capita. This finding holds true for the sample of
developing economies as well as, high-income economies. Thus, autocratic
states are more likely to benefit from natural resource dependence than
democratic states, as having a large natural resource endowment poses greater
problems for countries that have democratic institutions.
Figure 5. The effect on log of GDP of increasing SXP by 10% depends on the level
of democratization.
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Note: The graph shows the effect on log of GDP of increasing SXP by 10% at various
levels of democracy. For the high-income sample this is given by the equation, Δln gdp
= ΔSXP * (1.63 -0.243XDem), and for the middle and low-income sample, the equation
is Δln gdp = ΔSXP * (0.501 -0.170XDem).
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5. Conclusion
While democratization of institutions is significantly beneficial for
economic growth, this holds true only for resource-poor economies. In general,
democratic regimes do not utilize natural resources in a way that is conducive
for economic development. This finding holds true for countries at high levels
of development as well as low. Let us focus on the high-income, resource-rich
countries as these may hold some policy lessons for those that have been less
successful.
There are countries at both ends of the democratic spectrum in this
group, with countries like Norway, Iceland and Canada performing successfully
under democratic regimes, and countries like Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and UAE
reaching high development levels under autocratic regimes. The success of the
above advanced democracies is contradictory to the general trend, where
democracy negatively impacts natural resource-dependent countries. The
literature largely suggests that this may be the result of a mature and transparent
system, which does not allow corruption, bribery and misallocation of
resources. Another important point is that high levels of social, political and
economic advancement result in general well being, a satisfied citizenry and
little unrest. In such conditions, democratization is unlikely to spur factionalism
and violent struggles for control of the resources. The results might not be so
favorable, however, in more unequal economies.
Thus, it is important to consider that there are other important policies
that regimes of resource-rich countries must adopt that are not particular to
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either democratic or autocratic regimes. One of these may be the manner in
which resource rents are utilized, so that governments that loot rather than
invest them in long-term development will prevent economic growth, whether
they are democratic or autocratic. Another is the establishment of efficient
property rights and laws that will favor the investment and the growth of the
private sector. Although these characteristics may exist in any regime, they are
generally believed to be closely associated with democratization. Only in the
case of such a mature democracy can democratic institutions be beneficial for
economic growth in resource-rich countries (Eifert, et al., 2002). As such a
polity may take years to develop, marginal steps towards democratization hold
little benefits. Instead, they serve to increase instability and opportunities for
corruption, so that autocratic regimes are preferable in all cases except for the
perfect democracies.
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